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Abstract
Unequal outcomes disrupt cooperation in some situations, but this has not been
tested in the context of coordination in economic games. To explore this, we tested
brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) on a manual version of the Stag Hunt (or
Assurance) Game, in which individuals sequentially chose between two options, Stag
or Hare, and were rewarded according to their choices and that of their partner.
Typically, coordination on Stag results in an equal highest payout, whereas co-
ordinating on Hare results in a guaranteed equal but lower payoff and uncoordinated
play results in the lowest payoff when playing Stag. We varied this structure such
that one capuchin received double the rewards for the coordinated Stag outcome;
thus, it was still both animals' best option, but no longer equally rewarding. Despite
the inequality, capuchins coordinated on Stag in 78% of trials, and neither payoff
structure nor their partner's choice impacted their decision. Additionally, there was
no relationship between self‐scratching, a measure of stress in capuchins, and
choices. After completing the study, we discovered our reward, cheerios, was suf-
ficiently valuable that in another study, capuchins never refused it, so post hoc we
repeated the study using a lower value reward, banana flavored pellets. Capuchins
completed only 26% of the pellet trials (compared to 98% with cheerios), con-
straining our ability to interpret the results, but nonetheless the monkeys showed a
decrease in preference for Stag, particularly when they received fewer rewards for
the coordinated Stag outcome. These results reinforce capuchins' ability to find
coordinated outcomes in the Stag Hunt game, but more work is needed to determine
whether the monkeys did not mind the inequality or were unwilling to sacrifice a
highly preferred food to rectify it. In either case, researchers should carefully con-
sider the impact of their chosen rewards on subjects' choices.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2021 The Authors. American Journal of Primatology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; df, degrees of freedom; ELPD, estimated log‐predictive density; GLMM, generalized linear mixed model; LRC, language research center; SD, standard
deviation; SE, standard error.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Equally contributing to achieve a shared goal does not guarantee an
equally shared payoff. Dominance, chance, and other factors can
make cooperation less beneficial for one party than the other, and
research on inequity aversion (see reviews by Brosnan & de
Waal, 2014; Oberliessen & Kalenscher, 2019) suggests that this
should negatively impact cooperation. Indeed, at least some species
are sensitive to inequity in the context of cooperation, with co-
operation rates dropping off when one individual can dominate re-
wards (deWaal & Davis, 2003) or fails to share the benefits (Brosnan
et al., 2006; Massen et al., 2015). Moreover, in the wild, cooperation
does not lead to equal outcomes for everyone, although we do not
know whether cooperation rates would differ were outcomes more
equal. Nonetheless, experimental studies of cooperation, particularly
in animals, often use equal payoff structures that do not reflect this
reality. This is in part because the goal of these studies is typically to
determine whether cooperation occurs, and so they are designed to
maximize the chances of successful cooperation (hence, equal out-
comes). To better understand cooperation under more ecologically
realistic contexts, we need to determine how unequal pay influences
the decision to cooperate.
Cooperation, as we define it here, involves interactions that, on
average, provide a direct fitness benefit to the partners involved
(Brosnan & Bshary, 2010; for a review of cooperation terminology
see Noë, 2006). There are many examples in the animal kingdom,
including group hunting (Bailey et al., 2013; Boesch et al., 2006;
MacNulty et al., 2014), shared rearing of offspring (Gilchrist &
Russell, 2007; Griffin et al., 2005; Russell et al., 2007), and territory
defense (Farabaugh et al., 1992; Olendorf et al., 2004). Despite this
prevalence, the benefits of cooperation are often not equally dis-
tributed. For example, when chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) cooperate
to hunt prey together, the amount of food that they obtain depends
on rank, age, and other factors related to their performance in the
hunt (Boesch, 1994). Indeed, while food sharing based on participa-
tion in the hunting is more common at the Taï National Park site
(Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Samuni et al., 2018) than in many other
chimpanzee sites (Gilby et al., 2008; Samuni et al., 2018; Watts &
Mitani, 2002), nonetheless chimpanzees that perform the most im-
portant roles in the hunt take the biggest pieces of the meat
(Boesch, 2002; Samuni et al., 2018). This also suggests that co-
operation may succeed despite inequality, particularly in contexts in
which it is justified (i.e., those who participate to a greater degree get
a greater share of the outcome).
The question, then, is whether and in what contexts unequal
outcomes negatively impact cooperation (Brosnan & deWaal, 2014).
The link between cooperation and inequality has thus far been ex-
plored in two ways. First, from a phylogenetic perspective, multiple
species respond negatively to disadvantageous inequity, or receiving
less than a partner (e.g., Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Massen
et al., 2012; Wascher & Bugnyar, 2013; Yasue et al., 2018). Many
species that respond negatively also routinely cooperate with nonkin
in other contexts, such as group hunting or food sharing (Brosnan &
de Waal, 2014), which suggests a link between cooperation and in-
equity. Species with less cooperative tendencies, such as orangutans
(Pongo pygmaeus; Brosnan, Flemming et al., 2011), squirrel monkeys
(Saimiri sciureus and Saimiri boliviensis; Talbot et al., 2011), and keas
(Nestor notabilis; Heaney et al., 2017), tend not to react negatively to
unequal payoffs. This supports the hypothesis, proposed initially by
economists (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), that inequity aversion and co-
operation coevolved, perhaps because inequity aversion allows in-
dividuals to identify and avoid individuals that are not good
cooperative partners, and specifically predicts that species that co-
operate routinely should be more sensitive to inequality (Brosnan &
de Waal, 2014; Brosnan, 2011; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).
The second way that this link has been explored is by looking at
the effects of unequal outcomes on cooperation. Many species are
very successful at working together to achieve outcomes (i.e., co-
operative tasks), such as jointly pulling a heavy tray closer, that they
cannot achieve on their own. Consistent with the above, inequality
often reduces the frequency or success of cooperation compared to
when rewards are equal or can be shared (Campbell et al., 2020;
Cronin & Snowdon, 2008; Massen et al., 2015; Melis et al., 2006).
Studies of capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) have shown that
in a bar‐pulling task, cooperation depends on the presentation of
rewards and whether or how their partner shares with them. For
example, capuchins tend to cooperate more with partners that share
rewards (de Waal & Berger, 2000) and cooperate less when rewards
are clumped, such that they can be monopolized, instead of dis-
persed, which makes monopolization more difficult (de Waal &
Davis, 2003). When capuchins were presented with a version of the
bar‐pulling task in which rewards were unequal and they could freely
choose their position, the dyads that alternated which animal re-
ceived the best reward did not show a decrease in cooperative
outcomes (Brosnan et al., 2006); essentially they eliminated the in-
equity through their actions. Taken together, these results make it
clear that inequity does influence capuchin cooperation, but that
many animals appear to be able to use different approaches to adjust
to it, including both curtailing cooperation and, more positively, re-
ducing the inequity and thereby maintaining the cooperation.
One situation in which the impacts of inequality have not been ex-
plored is coordination in economic games. Recently, experimental eco-
nomic games have been used to study various economic decisions,
including cooperation, across species. Doing so allows for use of the
same, or very similar, methods, thus making results more directly com-
parable across species, including humans (Brosnan, 2018; Watzek
et al., 2018). In these games, subjects each make a decision and are
rewarded depending on both their choices and that of their partner. In
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the simplest games, each member of a pair makes a dichotomous choice,
such that there are four possible outcomes between the two players. One
such game, the Assurance Game (also known as the Stag‐Hunt Game;
Skyrms, 2004), is a coordination game with two strategies, Stag and Hare.
Both players do better if they coordinate on Stag (which rewards both
partners equally), but Hare is the risk‐free strategy because each player
gets a lower payoff regardless of what their partner chooses. Both Stag/
Stag and Hare/Hare are Nash equilibria, although Stag/Stag is payoff
dominant. Uncoordinated play is the worst possible outcome because the
player who plays Stag receives nothing. Stag/Stag is thus a mutual best
response for both players, but if a player is unsure their partner will play
Stag—or whether they understand the game—Hare is the risk‐free option.
The Assurance Game has been presented to four species of non-
human primates, all of which have shown coordination to at least some
degree, although the frequency with which they find it and the me-
chanism by which they do so vary. Chimpanzees have shown very high
levels of understanding the game, including evidence of strategic behavior
(Brosnan, Parrish, et al., 2011; Bullinger et al., 2011; Duguid et al., 2014),
although they may also settle for the easy option of matching their
partner, which still rewards them at very high levels (2.5 rewards per trial,
on average; Brosnan, Parrish, et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2019). Rhesus ma-
caques (Macaca mulatta) also do very well, playing Stag/Stag, but appar-
ently based on a preference for the on‐average higher paying token
(Parrish et al., 2014). Somewhat surprisingly, female Bolivian squirrel
monkeys showed some degree of coordination, albeit less than the other
species (Vale et al., 2019). Although squirrel monkeys are not generally
cooperative, this is the demographic that is the most so, suggesting a
need to be more specific when considering the demographics of co-
operation. Finally, a few capuchins have coordinated in manual tasks, but
capuchins have generally all succeeded in coordinating in computerized
tasks, a difference that may be due to the increased number of trials per
session and the shorter latency between choice and reward in compu-
terized testing, both of which may support learning. However, capuchins
appear to play the Stag/Stag Nash equilibrium by matching their partner's
play, only succeeding when they can see what their partner has already
played (Brosnan, 2011; Brosnan et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2019).
What is not known is how coordination would be impacted if their
outcomes in these games were unequal. In particular, what if one subject
were to receive a substantially higher payoff for playing Stag than the
other, so it was still in both subjects' best interests to coordinate, but the
subjects who got the lesser outcome would now face inequality? The
situation is particularly complicated if choosing the Hare option meant
they received absolutely less, but relatively the same. On the one hand,
we know that unequal outcomes negatively impact cooperation in other
contexts (such as the bar pull task), suggesting that coordination should
be similarly impacted. Moreover, monkeys routinely sacrifice foods that
they would typically eat to apparently protest unequal outcomes
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2014), suggesting the animal receiving the lower
value may choose to switch toHare to avoid inequality, especially as there
is no obvious reason for why one partner should get a greater reward (as
in the chimpanzee group hunt). On the other hand, even the partner
getting the lower value reward does absolutely better playing Stag, sug-
gesting that they may still prefer to play it even if it results in a relatively
less good payoff. Supporting this, in other economic games in which
outcomes are not equal, such as the Hawk‐Dove game, capuchins con-
tinue to play a Nash equilibrium despite receiving less than their partner
(Smith et al., 2019).
It is also important to note that just because an animal accepts an
unequal outcome (for instance, continuing to play a Nash equilibrium in
the Hawk‐Dove game or Stag in our unequal payoff Assurance Game),
does not mean they are not sensitive to unequal pay. For example, dogs
typically do not stop participating in a task when there is a dis-
advantageous difference in the reward's quality, but they show more
stress behaviors (Brucks et al., 2016, 2017; Range et al., 2009) and gaze
more towards their partners (Brucks et al., 2016, 2017; McGetrick
et al., 2019) when the rewards are unequal. Children, too, continue to
participate when receiving less, but protest to the partner (LoBue
et al., 2011). Such a study has not been done in primates. However, in
other contexts, primates show their frustration by performing displace-
ment behaviors, which appear in situations characterized by psychosocial
stress and include behaviors and include yawning and self‐scratching
(Maestripieri et al., 1992; Troisi, 2002). In capuchin species, self‐scratching
increases in response to potentially stressful situations, including receiving
aggression (Daniel et al., 2009), isolation from conspecifics (Petrillo
et al., 2017), and when making choices with uncertain outcomes
(Sorrentino et al., 2012), suggesting that it serves a similar function. Thus,
for the current study, we also measured self‐scratching behavior to see if
we could detect similar behavioral differences as seen with dogs and
humans even in contexts in which the capuchins accepted the inequality.
Brown capuchins are an ideal species to study the impact of unequal
payoffs on coordination in the Assurance Game for several reasons. As
discussed above, they naturally cooperate, even with nonkin (as reviewed
by Brosnan, 2011), they are sensitive to inequality (for review seeTable 1
in Brosnan & de Waal, 2014), and may punish those who benefit from
unequal pay (Leimgruber et al., 2016). Additionally, capuchins coordinate
in both manual and, particularly, computerized versions of the Assurance
Game (Brosnan, Parrish, et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2019), which is essential
for determining whether unequal outcomes negatively impact coordina-
tion. That being said, despite their increased coordination on computer-
ized paradigms, we used a manual task rather than a computerized one
because our previous work found that capuchins coordinated nearly
100% of the time in the computerized version, and we did not want to
use a task for which they were already at ceiling. Finally, we displayed first
players' choices (so that second players could see them) because previous
work shows that seeing each other's choices is essential for capuchins to
ever reach the coordinated outcome, in both manual and computerized
paradigms (Brosnan, Parrish, et al., 2011; Brosnan et al., 2012; Smith
et al., 2019). Unlike in previous studies, here we explicitly adopted a
traditional extensive form game, controlling which player made the choice
TABLE 1 Payout matrix for variable reward assurance game
Choice Stag Hare
Stag 4 or 2, 4 or 2 0, 1
Hare 1, 0 1, 1
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first in every session, so that the second player, who had the less valuable
Stag outcome, always knew the partner's choice before making their own
choice. We included a behavioral component, self‐scratching behavior, to
explore the possibility that even if our subjects were choosing the co-
ordinate on Stag despite the inequality, they found doing so to be
stressful.
We wanted to determine if unequal rewards and the actions of
their partners impacted capuchins' choices in a cooperative task. We
initially ran the experiment with cheerios (a type of oat cereal) as the
reward. This is the typical reward used in our lab for all manual eco-
nomic game tasks because it is both easy to manipulate and un-
sweetened. However, after completing the study, we discovered that
cheerios are a high value reward to our monkeys that was, for many,
equivalent in value to grapes (Talbot et al., 2018). This is a problem for
this study as the same research also found that even the same ca-
puchins who routinely refused rewards when their partners got better
ones did not do so when they were given foods that were too high in
value, and in particular, did not refuse cheerios when their partner got
a greater number of them. This suggested that our results could have
been due to the monkeys so strongly preferring cheerios that they
would always choose the option that gave them more no matter what
the partner got, even if they did care about inequity. Thus, we reran
the experiment using the lowest value reward that we could find for
which they would routinely exchange tokens in preference testing
(banana flavored pellets) as the reward. Finally, we looked at whether
self‐scratching varied depending on which option the subjects chose.
Given previous studies showing capuchins continue to choose out-
comes in economic games that maximized their rewards despite the
fact that their partner received more (Smith et al., 2019), we predicted
that capuchin monkeys would also continue coordinating in the As-
surance Game, despite the unequal rewards. Additionally, we pre-
dicted that the monkeys would show more displacement behaviors
(i.e., self‐scratching) in the sessions in which they received dis-
advantageous unequal pay.
2 | METHODS
2.1.1 | Ethical approval
This study was noninvasive and approved by the Georgia State
University IACUC (A16031). We additionally followed the guidelines
for the Principles for the Ethical Treatment of Non‐Human Primates
(American Society of Primatologists, 2001).
2.1.2 | Data availability
These data have been made publicly available in Data S1 and S2 and
in an online repository (https://osf.io/h7emb/).
2.1.3 | Subjects
We studied six pairs (1: M/M, 1: F/F, 4: M/F) of capuchin monkeys
ranging from 9 to 20 years old, drawn from social groups housed at
Georgia State University's Language Research Center (LRC) in Atlanta,
Georgia; information on each animal's sex and group can be found in
Table S1. Subjects came from one of five mixed‐sex socially house
capuchin groups at the facility, each of which has its own indoor/
outdoor enclosure with enrichment and climbing structures. Subjects
had been housed in the same social group since either 2005 or their
birth at the LRC. Capuchins at the LRC are never deprived of food for
testing purposes and water is available at all times, including during
testing sessions.
All studies at the LRC are noninvasive and subjects voluntarily
choose to participate. Subjects are never deprived of food, water, treats,
outdoor time, or social contact to encourage participation, but could
choose to enter individual test boxes where the experiment took place.
There was no consequence for choosing not to participate other than not
being able to participate in the activity. Upon the completion of testing
TABLE 2 Testing block player and payout schedule for variable
reward assurance game
Block 1 Player 1 Player 2 Block 1 Player 1 Player 2
Dyad Stag = 2 Stag = 4 Dyad Stag = 4 Stag = 2








Nkima/Nala Nala Nkima Liam/Logan Liam Logan
Block 2 Player 1 Player 2 Block 2 Player 1 Player 2
Dyad Stag = 4 Stag = 2 Dyad Stag = 2 Stag = 4








Nkima/Nala Nkima Nala Liam/Logan Logan Liam
Block 3 Player 1 Player 2 Block 3 Player 1 Player 2
Dyad Stag = 2 Stag = 4 Dyad Stag = 4 Stag = 2








Nkima/Nala Nkima Nala Liam/Logan Logan Liam
Block 4 Player 1 Player 2 Block 4 Player 1 Player 2
Dyad Stag = 4 Stag = 2 Dyad Stag = 2 Stag = 4








Nkima/Nala Nala Nkima Liam/Logan Liam Logan
4 of 18 | ROBINSON ET AL.
(approximately 30min), the subjects were released back into their social
group. All subjects had previously been trained to exchange tokens for
food rewards.
2.1.4 | Unequal assurance game
In the Assurance Game individuals must decide whether to coordinate for
a large reward that is dependent on their partner's choice or not co-
ordinate for a guaranteed smaller reward. In the traditional game, Stag/
Stag is the payoff‐dominant Nash equilibrium.1 Playing Hare results in a
sure smaller reward; hence, Hare/Hare is the risk‐dominant Nash equili-
brium. Playing Stag when the partner plays Hare brings no reward at all,
making the uncoordinated outcome the worst possible outcome for the
individual who chooses Stag. In our case, we were interested in their
decisions when the Stag/Stag equilibrium gave the two players different
rewards; in both cases, subjects got more by playing mutual Stag than any
other possibility, but one partner got half as many rewards (2 vs. 4) as
compared to their partner (see Table 1 for a payoff matrix).
2.1.5 | Quantity testing
All subjects' preferences were previously tested on different quan-
tities of cheerios and all significantly preferred four cheerios over two
cheerios and two cheerios over one cheerio (Leinwand & Brosnan,
unpublished data). Subjects were given a choice between the two
quantities, alternating the side on which each was presented, and
were able to eat whichever one they picked. To meet criterion,
subjects had to prefer the greater number of cheerios to the fewer on
at least 8 out of 10 trials on each of two separate days.
2.1.6 | Testing procedure
First, the subjects were called into individual test boxes that were
attached to the indoor section of their group's home enclosure, si-
tuated side by side. Test boxes were 18″ apart (hence subjects were
TABLE 3 Player 2's choice of Stag
predicted by Player 1's choice and Player
2's maximum reward payout
Term b SE CI p
Intercept 4.66 0.86 (3.51, 6.35)
Player 1's choice (Stag) −1.40 0.77 (−2.74, −0.42) 0.072
Trial numbera 0.40 0.75 (−0.72, 1.49) 0.59
Block numberb 1.04 0.94 (−0.51, 2.73) 0.27
Player's 2 maximum payout −0.55 0.22 (−0.96, −0.18) 0.014
Player 1 choice (Stag): Trial number −0.31 0.75 (−1.40, 0.80) 0.68
Player 1 choice (Stag): Block number 0.03 0.72 (−1.12, 1.08) 0.96
Trial number: Block number 1.59 0.74 (0.47, 2.74) 0.032
Player 1 choice (Stag): Player 2's maximum payout 0.47 0.22 (0.13, 0.84) 0.034
Trial number: Player 2's maximum payout −0.06 0.22 (−0.41, 0.28) 0.77
Block number: Player 2's maximum payout −0.09 0.28 (−0.62, 0.45) 0.75
Player 1 choice (Stag): Trial number: Block number −1.19 0.68 (−2.23, −0.24) 0.082
Player 1 choice (Stag): Trial number: Player 2's maxium
payout
0.12 0.22 (−0.22, 0.45) 0.60
Player 1 choice (Stag): Block number: Player 2's maxium
payout
0.02 0.20 (−0.32, 0.36) 0.92
Trial number: Block number: Player 2's maxium payout −0.44 0.22 (−0.82, −0.09) 0.044
Player 1 choice (Stag): Trial number: Block number: Player
2's maxium payout
0.34 0.20 (0.03, 0.68) 0.084
Note: Bold values were significant at p < 0.05.
Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval.
az‐Transformed to a mean of zero and a standard deviation (SD) of one; mean and SD of the original
ranks were 20.50 and 11.54, respectively.
bz‐Transformed to a mean of zero and a SD of one; mean and SD of the original ranks were 2.49 and
1.12, respectively.
1A Nash equilibrium is a strategy where a player can do no better by changing their strategy
as long as their partner's strategy remains constant (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991).
ROBINSON ET AL. | 5 of 18
separated by that distance from their partner). Subjects were only
tested with other members of their established social group. Each
test box was outfitted with a clear Lexan door with two holes large
enough for the monkey to reach through to the container containing
the two types of tokens (Stag and Hare). The tokens were approxi-
mately 1″ diameter three dimensional hexagons printed in food safe
MakerBot brand filament using a MakerBot 3D printer. The Stag
token was orange in color while the Hare token was black in color,
however because capuchins are often dichromats, the Hare token
also included one white spot on each of the hexagon faces while the
Stag token was solid in color to offer an additional method to dis-
criminate the options.
For each trial, each subject made their choice from their own
container of tokens, which always included three Stag tokens and
three Hare tokens. The experimenter shook the container, before
presenting it to the subject, to ensure the tokens were randomly
arranged in the container; this choice mechanism was used to
avoid the side biases common in primate studies. The subject
designated as Player 1 was given the option to choose their token
first. Once Player 1 chose a token, that monkey handed it back to
the experimenter, who took it, held it in front of the Lexan door
so that both individuals could see it, and then placed it on the
piece of paper we used to increase visual contrast and emphasize
the chosen token. This was located between the two monkeys on
the testing cart that held the choice containers, in view of both
subjects. This procedure was then repeated for Player 2. Fol-
lowing Player 2's token exchange, the subjects were simulta-
neously rewarded with cheerios according to both subjects'
choices, one cheerio at a time to maximize the likelihood that
they saw both what they and their partner received (e.g., for
coordinated Stag play, the experimenter would hand both sub-
jects a cheerio, followed by the second, and so forth, whereas for
uncoordinated play, only the subject who chose Hare got a single
cheerio). Once the subjects finished eating their food rewards,
the next trial began.
One key difference between this test and our previous work is the
explicitly sequential choice of the partners. In previous work, both in
manual (exchange‐based) and computerized versions of the task, subjects
were presented with their choices simultaneously (and in some versions
of the computerized task, they did not know what their partner had
chosen until they had made their choice; Brosnan, Flemming et al. 2011;
Smith et al., 2018). In our case, however, the sequential choice was es-
sential so that the second player could make their choice based on what
the first player chose. Although this changes the structure of the game
from prior work, we note that in our earlier work subjects would only play
the coordinated Nash equilibrium reliably when they could see their
partner's choice anyway, suggesting that they habitually play the game
sequentially, making their choice based on their partner's play. All sessions
were videotaped for further analysis, although 12 sessions are missing
due to recorder malfunctions. In those cases, analysis was based on ex-
perimenter coded data, and we did not include those sessions in analyses
of self‐scratching (because those data were not coded by the experi-
menter in real time).
2.1.7 | Lower value food test
We initially planned to run the study using only the cheerios breakfast
cereal as the food reward. However, subsequent to the completion of
testing, another study we completed with the same monkeys found that
subjects that would refuse lower value foods when their partner got a
better one did not refuse high value foods, even if their partner did get an
even more preferred one. Moreover, cheerios were very highly valued;
many subjects preferred them as highly as grapes and no subject con-
sistently refused them in a quantity based inequity test in which their
partner got a greater number of cheerios, even though some of the same
monkeys refused lower‐value foods if their partners got more preferred
ones (and all monkeys had passed quantity preference tests demon-
strating that they preferred more to fewer cheerios in a direct dichot-
omous choice; Talbot et al., 2018). Because this suggested that our results
could simply be due to monkeys' unwillingness to refuse cheerios, re-
gardless of what their partner received, we decided, post hoc, to repeat
the study using a lower value food.
Unfortunately, it was challenging to find a food that all subjects
considered lower value than cheerios and for which the capuchins
would consistently work. Eventually we settled on Bio‐Serve pre-
cision banana flavored pellets, their typical reward in computerized
tasks and one for which they would exchange tokens. A preference
test (using the same procedure outlined above) demonstrated that
all but one subject preferred cheerios to pellets 100% of the time,
and the exceptional subject preferred cheerios to pellets 90% of the
time. Once testing was underway, however, most subjects began
refusing to work for the pellets and no pair completed all of these
sessions. Because these results shed light on the hypothesis that the
food value influenced responses to the task, we analyzed and pre-
sent this partial data set, but emphasize that these results cannot be
taken as conclusive. Nonetheless, we think it is important to discuss
the challenges inherent in finding appropriate rewards for cognitive
and behavioral experiments.
2.1.8 | Testing schedule
The goal was for each pair to participate in 20 sessions consisting of 40
trials for each reward type, although, again, no subject completed testing
with the pellets. No subject participated in more than one session per day
and subjects were generally tested 2–3 days per week. The 20 sessions
were separated into four blocks (i.e., four blocks of five sessions each) so
that each subject played in each of the four possible combinations of
being Player 1 or Player 2 and reward payout for choosing Stag. The
payout for Hare remained the same throughout the study. The block
schedules were counterbalanced such that three players began with
Player 1 receiving the Stag payout of two cheerios while the other three
pairs began with Player 1 receiving a Stag payout of four cheerios. Be-
cause we ran the pellet study to address a post hoc question that
emerged after the completion of the original round of testing, all subjects
completed all sessions with cheerios as a reward first before running the
sessions with pellets as the reward.
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2.1.9 | Behavioral coding
All sessions were videotaped, however as noted above, we lost
12 sessions due to equipment failure and one dyad failed to complete
two sessions. For the remaining cheerio sessions, we coded the
number of self‐scratching bouts across a session using Loopy (http://
loopb.io; Loopbio GmbH). Self‐scratching was defined as “the focal
(i.e., observed) capuchin moves its hand or foot rapidly drawing its
fingers/fingernails, toes/toenails, or the back of the hand across the
hair or skin; when the hand or foot stops moving the event is done.”
In some videos, one or both animals were difficult to see, thus making
it difficult to get an accurate self‐scratching count. Therefore, we
only coded videos where both animals were clearly visible, this left us
with 83 coded sessions across the six dyads. Six volunteers coded
how long a session lasted and the frequency of self‐scratching for
each animal in a dyad across the entire session,
Although the common convention regarding interobserver reliability
is to randomly select 20% of the observations to second code, this is not
supported by any statistical reason for doing so. Arguably, by randomly
selecting 20% of the videos, one may not get an equal representation of
the data across the chosen videos. For example, the videos with the
highest frequency of a behavior, in this case scratching bouts, may not be
randomly selected and, as such, reliability is only assessed when
scratching is less frequent. Therefore, we took an alternative approach:
We first constructed a series of eight integer numbers spanning from the
minimum to the maximum number of scratching bouts per video
(rounding ensured that they were all integers). We then selected one
video for each of these targeted numbers, whereby we chose the one
with a number scratches as close as possible to the targeted value (if
several were equally close, we randomly selected one of them). By doing
so we made sure that the range of the number scratches was roughly
evenly represented in the videos to be recoded. This resulted in eight
videos to be coded a second time. This reliability coding was performed
by two of the volunteers, neither of whom coded any videos they coded
the first time. We found interobserver agreement of ρ=0.91 for counts
of self‐scratching bouts across the sessions, suggesting the scratching
data was appropriately reliable for statistical analysis.
2.2 | Data analyses
All statistics were performed using R version 4.0.0 (R Core
Team, 2020).
2.2.1 | Cheerios analyses
To model the influence of the partner's choice (i.e., Stag or Hare) and
reward maximum reward payout (i.e., player received two or four
cheerios for choosing Stag) we used Generalized Linear Mixed
Models (GLMM; Baayen, 2008) with a binomial error structure and
logit link function using the glmer function in lme4 package in R
(Bates et al., 2015).
To investigate if Player's 1 choice to coordinate (i.e., if they selected
Stag) and the reward structure (i.e., did they receive two or four cheerios
for coordinating on Stag) influenced Player 2's choice to coordinate (i.e., if
they selected Stag), we included Player 1's choice, Player 2's maximum
reward payout for the trial, trial number, block number (i.e., which of the
four blocks the trials took place within), and their four‐way interaction,
including all the terms this encompassed, as fixed effects. We included
block number and trial number as fixed effects because we expected the
capuchins to learn the reward structure and adjust their choices in re-
sponse to their partner's choice as they participated in more trials and
blocks. We included the random intercepts of Player 2's identity and dyad
identity to control for the influence of identity (individual and dyad) on
choice as one individual or dyad may have been more cooperative than
another. We included the four‐way interaction, and all the terms it en-
compassed, of Player 1's choice, trial number, block number, Player 2's
maximum reward payout as random slopes to keep the Type I error rate
within 5% (Barr et al., 2013; Schielzeth & Forstmeier, 2009). However, we
found most of the absolute correlations to be close to 1, indicating they
were unidentifiable (Matuschek et al., 2017) and thus, added little to the
model while making it more complex. Therefore, following this, we re-
moved the correlations, resulting in a relatively minor change to model fit
(log‐likelihood with correlations: −1263.65, df=288; log‐likelihood with-
out correlations: −1282.20, df=48).
To investigate if Player 2's previous choice to coordinate (i.e., if they
chose to play Stag in the previous trial) and the reward structure (i.e., did
they receive two or four cheerios for coordinating on Stag) influenced
Player 1's choice to coordinate (i.e., if those chose Stag), we included
Player 2's previous choice, Player 1's maximum reward payout, trial
number, block number, and their four‐way interaction, including all the
terms this encompassed, as fixed effects. For the same reasons as in the
first model (i.e., learning), we included block number and trial number as
fixed effects. We included the random intercepts of Player 1's identity
and dyad identity to control for the influence of identity (individual and
dyad) on choice, as in the first model, because one individual or dyad may
have been more cooperative than another. We included the four‐way
interaction, and all the terms it encompassed, of Player 2's previous
choice to cooperate, trial number, block number, and Player 1's maximum
reward payout as random slopes, again to keep the Type I error rate
within 5% (Barr et al., 2013; Schielzeth & Forstmeier, 2009). As in the
previous model, we started by fitting the model, including the correlations
between the random slopes. Again, they were close to 1 and a loglik
comparison between the model with and without correlations revealed a
very minor change in the model fit. Thus, we then removed the corre-
lations (log‐likelihood with correlations: −1452.90, df=288; log‐likelihood
without correlations: −1472.23, df=48).
To test the effect of player choice and reward structure in the
models, we conducted full‐null model comparisons (Forstmeier &
Schielzeth, 2011) where the variables of interest are removed and the
model is compared to the full model to test if patterns in the data are the
result of random sampling (i.e., the full model is not significantly different
from the null model) or not (i.e., the full model is significantly different
from the null model; Gotelli & Ulrich, 2012). We did this to avoid cryptic
multiple testing (i.e., starting with the full model and removing
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nonsignificant variables from each model until there are only significant
variables left, thus increasing p‐inflation from increased numbers of
models; Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011) using a likelihood ratio test
(Dobson & Barnett, 2008). The null models were identical to the full
models except we removed player choice and the player's maximum
reward value, and also all the interactions they were involved in, from
both models. For all models, we z‐transformed trial number and block
number to aid model interpretation (Schielzeth, 2010) and before in-
cluding it as a random slope, we z‐transformed the player's maximum
reward payout to ease model convergence. We calculated the confidence
intervals of model estimates using a parametric bootstrap (N=1000
bootstraps).
Finally, to investigate if the reward structure influenced self‐
scratching behavior in the cheerio sessions, we took multiple steps. First,
we tested the interobserver reliability of our behavioral coding using a
Spearman's rank correlation. Following this, we fit a GLMM with Poisson
error distribution and log link function predicting the number of scratches
an animal performed across the session. As the fixed effects, we included
the interaction of block number and player's maximum reward; both block
number and maximum reward payout was z‐transformed. We included
the interaction of block number and maximum reward payout for co-
ordinating on Stag/Stag as random slopes within the random intercept of
subject ID. As an offset variable (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989), we included
the duration of the session, from the first animal's choice to the last
animal's choice, which we log transformed. Due to a problem with
overdispersion with the Poisson error distribution (dispersion para-
meter = 5.98), we switched to a negative binomial distribution, which
showed the model not to be over dispersed (dispersion parameter = 1.08)
and therefore, we interpreted the results of the negative binomial model.
As before, we performed a full null‐model comparison using the same
distribution; the null model consisted of the same variables except max-
imum reward payout was removed.
2.2.2 | Pellet analyses
As mentioned above, we reran the study with pellets as a food reward
due to the possibility that the capuchins never refused the cheerios be-
cause they were too high value (i.e., Talbot et al., 2018). Although they
initially consistently worked for our lower value food, pellets, which met
our criterion (cheerios preferred by every subject on more than 80% of
trials on two consecutive sessions), most monkeys rapidly ceased working
for pellets and no pair completed all tests. Thus, we analyze these data
but interpret the results cautiously, given the incomplete nature of the
data set.
To investigate if their partner's choice to coordinate (i.e., if they chose
to play Stag in the previous trial) and the maximum reward payoff (i.e., did
they receive two or four cheerios for coordinating on Stag) influenced
Player 1 and Player 2's choice to play Stag when pellets were used as
rewards, we first fit two GLMMs with Poisson error distribution.
In the first Poisson model, we included the number of times that
Player 1 chose Stag as the response variable. We included Player 2's
choice in the previous trial and Player 1's maximum reward payout, and
their two‐way interaction, as fixed effects. As an offset variable, we in-
cluded the total number of times Player 1 made a choice within each
parameter (e.g., the total number of Player 1 choices when Player 2 chose
Stag in the previous session and the animal's maximum payout was two
pellets). We included the random intercepts of Player 2's identity and
dyad identity because, as in the analyses of the data with cheerios as the
reward, one individual or dyad may have been more cooperative than
another.
In the second Poisson model, we included the number of times
that Player 2 chose Stag as the response variable. We included Player
1's choice and Player 2's maximum reward payout, and their two‐way
interaction, as fixed effects. As an offset variable, we included the
total number of times Player 2 made a choice within each parameter
(e.g., the total number of Player 2 choices when Player 1 chose Stag
and the animal's maximum payout was two pellets). We included the
random intercepts of Player 1's identity and dyad identity to account
for the possibility that one individual or dyad was more cooperative.
Second, to investigate whether payoff reward (i.e., cheerios or pel-
lets) influenced the animals' choice to coordinate, we conducted informed
Bayesian regressions with change points. We switched to a change point
analysis because the lack of counterbalancing in the pellet data did not
allow us to directly compare them to the cheerio data using standard
GLMMs, whereas change point analyses are used to detect when a trend
changes in sequential data. We followed a Bayesian approach that
models the probability of the parameters in the model taking into account
both prior beliefs (i.e., “priors”) on the distribution and mean of a variable
and the resulting probability once the actual data are introduced in the
model (McElreath, 2018). Using the mcp package in R (Lindeløv, 2020),
we tested if the proportion of Stag choices for Player 1 and Player 2
changed when the reward used were pellets (Session 21). As a first step,
we built an “empty”model (i.e., without data) consisting in one regression
line followed by a disjoined changing rate. As a prior belief, we indicate
that we expected a change in performance around Session 21. For the
rest of parameters, we used the default uninformative priors for a model
with one change point provided by the package (Dirichlet prior; Bürkner
& Charpentier, 2018).
Following this, we ran two sets of Generalized Linear Models
with binomial distribution, using either the proportion of Stag choices
for Player 1 or Player 2 as variable response and the session number
as predictor. Every set consisted in three models, one informed
model using the priors that we defined before (expected change
around Session 21), one uninformed model using the default priors,
and one null model that did not include any change point. We
checked the convergence of all the models using the Gelman–Rubin
convergence diagnostic. All the parameters were below 1.1, which
indicates good convergence (Gelman & Rubin, 1992).
Once we fit all the models, we tested the existence of the
change point and the contribution of the priors in our informed
model by comparing the predictive performance of the informed,
uninformed and null model in terms of their estimated log‐
predictive density (ELPD). To calculate the ELPD, the function
“loo” fits the model to the data multiple times, each time lacking
one of the data points. ELPD is obtained with the average log‐
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likelihood of all the models, indicating how well the model is able
to predict the data points that are lacking (Vehtari et al., 2017).
Therefore, the model with higher ELPD shows a superior pre-
dictive performance. We selected the model with higher ELPD for
the Stag choices of Player 1 and Player 2 to test the hypothesis of
the change point being between the Session 20 and 21. For this,
we computed the Bayes Factor via Savage–Dickey density ratio
and posterior contrast (Verdinelli & Wasserman, 1995), to assess
if our belief in the location of the change point is stronger after
fitting the data with the actual data.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Cheerio results
Across the sessions where cheerios were the reward, the six capuchin
dyads completed 4719 trials over 118 sessions (one dyad chose not to
complete two sessions) with cheerios as the reward. Of these trials, they
chose to coordinate on the payoff dominant Nash equilibrium (Stag/Stag)
3707 (78%) times and the risk dominant Nash equilibrium (Hare/Hare) 79
(2%) times and chose the uncoordinated outcome (Stag/Hare or Hare/
Stag) 933 (20%) times. On average, Player 1 chose Stag over Hare 87% of
the time when their maximum payout was two cheerios and 88% of the
time when their maximum payout was four cheerios (Figure 1). On
average, Player 2 chose Stag over Hare 91% of the time when their
maximum payout was two cheerios and 89% of the time when their
maximum payout was four cheerios (Figure 2).
3.1.1 | Model predicting Player 2's choice
Considering the model testing if Player 2's choice of Stag was influ-
enced by Player 1's choice and Player 2's maximum reward (i.e., two
or four cheerios for a Stag/Stag outcome), we found this model
(Table 3; estimated SD of random effects of model in Table S2) was
not significantly different from the null model (likelihood ratio test
comparing full and null model: χ2 = 13.13, df = 12, p = 0.36), sug-
gesting that variables where p < 0.05 were likely due to Type I error
due to multiple testing. There was also no significant effect of the
four‐way interaction of Player 1's choice, Player 2's maximum reward
payout, trial number, and block number (b = 0.34, SE = 0.20,
p = 0.084). In summary, there was no effect of Player 1's choice or
Player 2's maximum reward payout on Player 2's choice.
3.1.2 | Model predicting Player 1's choice
We next considered the model testing if Player 1's choice of Stag was
influenced by Player 1's maximum reward and if Player 2 chose Stag in
the previous trial. This model (Tables 4 and S3) was not significantly
different from the null model (likelihood ratio test comparing full and null
model: χ2 = 7.53, df=8, p=0.48), suggesting, as in the model of Player 2's
choices, that variables where p<0.05 were likely due to Type I error due
to multiple testing. There was also no significant effect of the four‐way
interaction of Player 2's previous choice, Player 1's maximum reward
payout, trial number, and block number (b=−0.07, SE = 0.22, p=0.76). In
summary, there was no effect of Player 2's previous choice or Player 1's
maximum reward payout on Player 1's choice.
3.1.3 | Model predicting self‐scratching behavior
Considering the model testing if self‐scratching behavior was asso-
ciated with maximum reward payout, we found this model (Table 5;
estimated SD of random effects of model in Table S4) was not sig-
nificantly different from the null model (likelihood ratio test com-
paring full and null model: χ2 = 1.28, df = 2, p = 0.53). There was also
no significant effect of the interaction of block number and maximum
reward payout (b = −0.15, SE = 0.15, p = 0.32). In summary, the
maximum reward payout did not influence the amount of self‐
scratching the capuchins performed.
3.2 | Pellet results
Overall, the capuchins completed 1266 of 4800 maximum possible
trials (26%) when pellets were the reward compared to 4719 of 4800
F IGURE 1 Player 1's average individual choice (Stag or Hare) ± SE
by their maximum payout for coordinating on Stag/Stag when
cheerios are the reward
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maximum possible trials (98%) when cheerios were the reward. On
average, each dyad completed 211 (SD ± 149.58) pellet trials com-
pared to 786.50 (SD ± 32.58) cheerio trials (Figure 3); note that the
number of trials completed varied by each dyad and individual. Of the
pellet trials, the capuchins chose to coordinate on the payoff domi-
nant Nash equilibrium (Stag/Stag) 491 (40%) times; they chose to play
the risk dominant Nash equilibrium (Hare/Hare) 175 (14%) times; they
chose the uncoordinated outcome (Stag/Hare or Hare/Stag) 600
(47%) times. On average, Player 1 chose Stag over Hare 49% of the
time when their maximum payout was two pellets and 75% of the
time when their maximum payout was four pellets (Figure 4). Player 2
chose Stag over Hare 47% of the time when their maximum payout
was two pellets and 57% of the time when their maximum payout
was four pellets (Figure 5).
3.2.1 | Poisson model predicting Player 1's choice
with pellets as the reward
Player 1 chose Stag significantly more when they received four
pellets instead of two (Table 6; estimated SD of random effects of
model in Table S5); there was no significant effect of Player 2's
previous choice. This model was significantly different from the
null model (likelihood ratio test comparing full and null model:
χ2 = 11.52, df = 2, p = 0.009).
3.2.2 | Poisson model predicting Player 2's choice
with pellets as the reward
Player 2 chose Stag significantly more when they received four
pellets instead of two (Table 7; estimated SD of random effects of
model in Table S6); there was no significant effect of Player 1's
choice. This model was significantly different from the null model
(likelihood ratio test comparing full and null model: χ2 = 11.50,
df = 2, p < 0.009).
3.2.3 | Bayesian model predicting Player 1's choice
based on reward value
The informed Bayesian regressions with change point showed that there
was a change in the proportion of Stag choices of Player 1 through the
sessions. When comparing the informed model with the null model
lacking any change, the informed model (with previous expectations on
the exact location of the change point) showed a higher predictive per-
formance (ESLD difference =−300.40). When comparing the informed
with the uninformed model, both showed an almost identical predictive
performance, with the uninformed model being slightly better (ESLD
difference =0.20). We therefore used the uninformed model to test if the
change point was located between the 20th and the 21st sessions. The
Bayes factor for the hypothesis stating that the change point is located
between the 20th and the 21st session tends to be infinite, as the pro-
portion of explained variance increases to one (Heck, 2019). This in-
dicates strong evidence in favor of our hypothesis (Lee &
Wagenmakers, 2014), thus we can conclude that capuchin monkeys
participating as Player 1 changed their pattern of choice when they
played with pellets as rewards. Specifically, the uninformed model found
the change point to be in the point 20.500 (high‐density
interval = 20.043–20.990; see Figure 6). Given the small difference in
ESLD between the model and the uninformed model, we also checked if
the informed model found a similar change point, which it did (change
point = 20.542, high‐density interval = 20.068–21.000).
3.2.4 | Bayesian model predicting Player 2's choice
based on reward value
In the case of Player 2, the comparison between the informed and the
null model also favored the informed model (ESLD difference =−246.80),
indicating the existence of a change point. When comparing the informed
with the uninformed model, both showed almost the same predictive
performance, with the uninformed model being slightly better (ESLD
difference =−0 to 1). We therefore used the uninformed model to test if
the change point was located between the 20th and the 21st sessions.
The Bayes factor for this hypothesis tends to be infinite, which indicates
that capuchin monkeys participating as Player 2 changed their pattern of
choices when the change in reward was introduced. Specifically, the
uninformed model found the change point to be in the point 20.497
(high‐density interval = 20.010–20.96; see Figure 7). The informed model
F IGURE 2 Player 2's average individual choice (Stag or Hare) ± SE
by their maximum payout for coordinating on Stag/Stag when
cheerios are the reward
10 of 18 | ROBINSON ET AL.
also found a similar change point (change point = 20.542, high‐density
interval = 20.068–21.00).
Taking these results together, we can infer that the change in
reward that occurred after Session 20 affected the performance of
the subjects. Subjects playing both as Player 1 or as Player 2 suddenly
dropped in the proportion of Stag choices when the reward was
changed from cheerios to pellets.
4 | DISCUSSION
Previous experimental studies of cooperation have tended to focus
on situations in which rewards were equal for both parties and have
often found that cooperation rates drop off when rewards are not
evenly distributed (Brosnan et al., 2006; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003;
Campbell et al., 2020; Cronin & Snowdon, 2008; de Waal &
Davis, 2003). However, these were typically tasks in which subjects
had to expend effort to work together, such as pulling in a coun-
terweighted tray to obtain food rewards. We explored whether ca-
puchins would show the same pattern when coordinating in an
economic game task, in which subjects must choose one of two
options and are rewarded according to what they and their partner
choose; earlier work suggested that capuchins are generally very
good at finding the coordinated outcome when rewards are equal.
Contrary to the earlier findings suggesting that inequality impacts
TABLE 4 Player 1's choice of Stag
predicted by Player 2's choice in the
previous trial and Player 1's maximum
reward payout
Term b SE CI p
Intercept 1.53 0.69 (0.36, 2.29)
Player 2's previous choice (Stag) 1.31 0.61 (0.28, 2.40) 0.032
Trial numbera −0.42 0.58 (−1.42, 0.55) 0.47
Block numberb −1.77 1.37 (−3.22, −0.00) 0.20
Player 1's maximum payout 0.42 0.22 (0.07, 0.89) 0.052
Player 2's previous choice (Stag): Trial number 0.30 0.64 (−0.72, 1.33) 0.64
Player 2's previous choice (Stag): Block number 1.35 0.60 (0.35, 2.54) 0.024
Trial number: Block number −0.07 0.58 (−1.09, 0.97) 0.90
Player 2's previous choice (Stag): Player 1's maximum
payout
−0.40 0.23 (−0.91, −0.03) 0.075
Trial number: Player 1's maximum payout 0.22 0.21 (−0.15, 0.57) 0.30
Block number: Player 1's maximum payout 0.77 0.47 (0.15, 1.30) 0.10
Player 2's previous choice (Stag): Trial number: Block
number
−0.07 0.60 (−1.12, 0.93) 0.90
Player 2's previous choice (Stag): Trial number: Player 1's
maxium payout
−0.15 0.22 (−0.52, 0.24) 0.51
Player 2's previous choice (Stag): Block number: Player 1's
maxium payout
−0.45 0.22 (−0.90, −0.06) 0.041
Trial number: Block number: Player 1's maxium payout 0.12 0.21 (−0.24, 0.48) 0.56
Player 2's previous choice (Stag): Trial number: Block
number: Player 1's maxium payout
−0.07 0.22 (−0.42, 0.32) 0.76
Note: Bold values were significant at p < 0.05.
Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval.
az‐Transformed to a mean of zero and a standard deviation (SD) of one; mean and SD of the original
ranks were 20.50 and 11.54, respectively.
bz‐Transformed to a mean of zero and a SD of one; mean and SD of the original ranks were 2.49 and
1.12, respectively.
TABLE 5 Self‐scratching frequency predicted by maximum
payoff
b SE CI p
Intercept −4.51 0.21 (−4.89, −4.09)
Block numbera −0.12 0.08 (−0.25, 0.02) 0.13
Maximum payoutb −0.02 0.09 (−0.16, 0.12) 0.78
Block number: maximum
payout
−0.15 0.15 (−0.42, 0.14) 0.32
Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval.
az‐Transformed to a mean of zero and a standard deviation (SD) of one;
mean and SD of the original ranks were 2.49 and 1.12, respectively.
bz‐Transformed to a mean of zero and a SD of one; mean and SD of the
original ranks were 2.96 and 1, respectively.
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cooperation, in the economic game we found that capuchin monkeys
continued to coordinate at very high rates, nearly 80% of the time,
despite one individual receiving twice the rewards of the other when
rewarded with a preferred reward. We also explored whether sub-
jects would, like humans and dogs, show behavioral signs of distress
at inequality in the form of displacement behavior, in this case self‐
scratching, despite not refusing to coordinate. However, we found no
relationship between self‐scratching and sessions in which the part-
ner received increased rewards.
It is not surprising that capuchins were able to coordinate on
the higher‐paying Stag equilibrium, as they have done so in many
previous studies (Brosnan, Parrish, et al., 2011; Brosnan
et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2019). What is surprising is that they
continued to do so despite the inequality, which negatively im-
pacts cooperation in other contexts. Indeed, the capuchins in this
study coordinated at a higher rate than capuchins in the earlier
manual task (Brosnan, Parrish, et al., 2011). Better performance
itself is not surprising, as these monkeys have gained sub-
stantially more experience with economic games since that time,
and previous work in chimpanzees suggests that experience ap-
pears to improve performance in economic games (Brosnan,
Parrish, et al., 2011). It is likely that the capuchins have learned
how to maximize their outcomes in these sorts of tasks. Indeed,
this is one possible explanation for their lack of a response to the
inequality; perhaps they have learned to look for the strategy that
maximizes their outcome and stick to that strategy irrespective of
other elements of the task. If their main goal is to maximize their
food intake, this is a robust strategy and would result in them
ignoring the inequality of outcome, as we found.
Another possible explanation is that the capuchins are less
sensitive to differences in quantity than quality. In the current
task, the rewards differed in quantity, whereas inequality aver-
sion studies usually use differences in quality (Brosnan
et al., 2013; Talbot et al., 2016). In a previous study, that included
four capuchins who completed this study, Talbot et al. (2018),
presented capuchins with a token exchange task in which the
animals could first see their partner receiving the same or a better
reward for performing the same token exchange, following which
they completed the exchange for the reward. Most monkeys were
more likely to refuse to participate if their partners received a
more preferred food than they did as compared to when their
partner got the same reward as long as they were giving up a
relatively less preferred food when they refused. However, this
was not the case in two situations. First, monkeys never refused if
they were receiving a high value food, even if their partner got an
even more preferred one. Second, monkeys never refused
cheerios, even if their partner got a greater number of them (this
was the study that suggested to us a need to rerun the task using
pellets instead of cheerios). In all of these studies, every monkey
passed a quantity discrimination test before testing, so we know
F IGURE 3 Number of completed trials by reward type
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that they preferred more to fewer when given a direct choice.
However, subsequent preference tests demonstrated that
cheerios were highly preferred, to the same degree as grapes for
many capuchins. Thus, one possible explanation is that the
cheerios were of such high value reward that the monkeys did not
care if their partner was getting more of them. Another possibility
is that they do not care about differences in quantity (indeed, this
may be particularly relevant when animals are 18″ apart, which
may make it difficult to discriminate the number of pieces of a
food their partner received). For the purposes of the current
study, either could be important.
Of course, as we alluded to above, it may simply be that the
cheerios were too valuable to reject. Indeed, humans accept greater
inequality in the Ultimatum Game when overall payoffs are higher
(Cameron, 1999). Our second condition was a post hoc attempt to
test this by studying subjects' responses with a lower value food.
However, we ran into the opposite problem; they quickly declined to
participate at all for the pellets (they happily accept them for com-
puterized testing, including computerized Assurance games, sug-
gesting that their failure to work for them in manual tasks is a
contrast effect due to the fact that they expect the more preferred
F IGURE 4 Player 1's average individual choice (Stag or Hare) ± SE
by their maximum payout for coordinating on Stag/Stag when pellets
are the reward
F IGURE 5 Player 2's average individual choice (Stag or Hare) ± SE
by their maximum payout for coordinating on Stag/Stag when pellets
are the reward
TABLE 6 Player 1's choice of Stag predicted by Player 2's choice
and Player 1's maximum reward payout with pellets as a reward
b SE CI p
Intercept −0.61 0.09 (−0.80,
−0.44)
Player 2's previous choice (Stag) 0.09 0.09 (−0.09,
0.27)
0.31
Player's 1 maximum payouta 0.22 0.09 (0.04, 0.40) 0.021
Player 2 previous choice (Stag):




Note: Bold values were significant at p < 0.05.
Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval.
az‐Transformed to a mean of zero and a standard deviation (SD) of one;
mean and SD of the original ranks were 3.11 and 1.02, respectively.
TABLE 7 Player 2's choice of Stag predicted by Player 1's choice
and Player 2's maximum reward payout with pellets as a reward
b SE CI p
Intercept −0.80 0.30 (−1.37,
−0.26)
Player 1's choice (Stag) 0.05 0.07 (−0.10,
0.22)
0.48
Player's 2 maximum payouta 0.21 0.06 (0.05, 0.38) 0.001





Note: Bold values were significant at p < 0.05.
Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval.
az‐Transformed to a mean of zero and a standard deviation (SD) of one;
mean and SD of the original ranks were 2.89 and 1.02, respectively.
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cheerios and fruit rewards). Indeed, only one pair reached even half
of the completed trials (400), whereas all but one pair finished all 800
trials when cheerios were the reward. This suggests to us that they
were less motivated to pay attention, and less motivated by the
possibility to earn rewards, when pellets were the reward.
When they did work, however, they coordinated on Stag/Stag
only 40% of the time, which is still greater than chance (25%, as there
are four possible outcomes), but notably less often than the 78%
Stag/Stag level when cheerios were the reward. Moreover, based on
this unfortunately sparse data set, they were also more likely to
choose Stag when they received four, rather than two, pellets, sug-
gesting that they may be sensitive to inequity—just not enough to
sacrifice two cheerios! This highlights a particular challenge for cog-
nitive and behavioral testing, particularly in situations in which the
question is how rewards are influencing behavior; it is difficult to find
a reward that is sufficiently valuable for it to be worth the subject's
time to participate, but not so high that they never refuse it. Taken in
combination with the earlier work that inspired us to run the post hoc
pellet condition (e.g., Talbot et al., 2018), these results suggest that
studies of cooperation, inequity, and possibly other social contexts,
such as social learning, must use extreme care when choosing re-
wards and, when possible, run studies using several different reward
values to determine whether a lack of an effect is due to the rewards
simply being too good to pass up.
Despite the suggestive data from the pellet condition, we cannot
rule out that the monkeys simply did not care that their partners got a
little more. Although many species show inequality aversion, they do
not refuse in every situation, particularly if they are receiving a pre-
ferred food themselves (Talbot et al., 2018). Moreover, as we dis-
cussed above, in nature, cooperating does not guarantee equal pay.
For example, chimpanzees do not share the spoils of their hunt
evenly (Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Samuni et al., 2018). However, this
seems unlikely given that in other contexts of experimental co-
operation, capuchins do respond when their partners get more (not
to mention the results of our own pellet condition). For instance,
studies with brown capuchins show that cooperation is impaired
when the rewards are clumped (Brosnan et al., 2006) or one in-
dividual tends to monopolize them (de Waal & Davis, 2003). Fur-
thermore, they even share (although unevenly) the spoils of the task
when these were obtained cooperatively (de Waal & Berger, 2000),
which suggests that brown capuchins do take the distributions of
cooperatively obtained rewards into account. Thus, we suspect that
the most likely explanation is that the cheerios were simply too high
value for the capuchins to refuse.
Contrary to our prediction, unequal pay was not associated with
increased self‐scratching, which suggests that receiving fewer cheerios
than a partner was not stressful for our capuchins, that they did not
notice it, or that self‐scratching was not the appropriate measure. Indeed,
F IGURE 6 Inferred model of posterior fit of the uninformed (left) and informed (right) model of the proportion of Stag choices of Player 1 by
session number. Raw data (black dots). Twenty‐five draws from the joint posterior (gray lines). Dashed red lines (95% highest‐density interval).
Blue density line (posterior distribution of the change point)
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this is a single measure, and while we know that our monkeys self‐scratch
when they are frustrated (Webster & Brosnan, accepted), in the future it
would be worth including other approaches (i.e., other behavioral mea-
sures, measures of salivary cortisol), especially since both dogs and hu-
mans have been shown to display behavioral responses to unequal
outcomes even in situations in which they accept the inequality (Brucks
et al., 2016, 2017; LoBue et al., 2011; Range et al., 2009). Aside from its
importance for cognitive and behavioral research, knowing when in-
equality causes stress is also important from a welfare perspective.
Our data have the limitations that we have previously discussed.
First, the pellet sessions always followed the cheerio sessions, and
compared to a design in which some dyads get pellets first and some get
cheerios first, it is difficult to know if the differences were due to a
contrast effect (Talbot et al., 2018) of going from high value rewards to
low value or due to another reason, such as a natural progression of
participating in so many sessions of the same paradigm. Second, while we
analyzed the results of the pellet condition, we were unable to collect all
of the data (which is, admittedly, data in and of itself), and the Bayesian
regressions with change points have been recommended to be used as
part of pre‐registered analysis plan (Lindeløv, 2020), which is not our case.
Finally, we suffered from a problem typical in such studies: A small sample
size that makes it difficult to test more complex associations and consider
any other factors, such as experience or age. Indeed, although we built a
statistical model to test for several factors, it is likely that our model was
substantially underpowered.
Overall, our results suggest the relationship between coopera-
tion, coordination, and inequality aversion is context dependent. We
show that capuchins who react to getting less than a partner in some
contexts are willing to continue coordinating at very high rates in the
Assurance game, even when their partner is getting a greater number
of rewards than they do, as long as those rewards are preferred, but
our pellet condition hints that they might be more likely to choose
relative equity over absolute gains when it does not require sacrifi-
cing such a preferred reward. While we cannot rule out other factors,
we suspect that, as in Talbot et al. (2018), our monkeys' lack of re-
sponse to inequity is due to the high value of the reward (cheerios).
As a broader point, results emphasize the need to pay careful at-
tention to what rewards are used in each test and to consider what
effects they may have on subjects' decisions, particularly in contexts
such as cooperation and social learning in which the reward itself is
an important part of the decision process.
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